Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On a New Way to Read Data from Memory
SISW '02 Proceedings of the First International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Design principles for tamper-resistant smartcard processors
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
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Smart cards and embedded systems are part of everyday life. A lot of them contain sensitive data like keys used in secure applications. These keys have to be transferred from non-volatile to static memory to generate signatures or encrypt data. Hence, the possibility to read out the static memory of a device is a crucial security threat. This paper presents a new technique to read out secret data from the internal static memory of a cryptographic device. A chemical reaction of the top metal layer of a decapsulated chip is used to identify lines connected to the positive power supply. Using this information, we are able to obtain the content of memory cells like the secret key of a cryptographic system.