A Fault Attack on Pairing-Based Cryptography

  • Authors:
  • Daniel Page;Frederik Vercauteren

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Transactions on Computers
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Current fault attacks against public key cryptography focus on traditional schemes, such as RSA and ECC, and, to a lesser extent, on primitives such as XTR. However, bilinear maps, or pairings, have presented theorists with a new and increasingly popular way of constructing cryptographic protocols. Most notably, this has resulted in efficient methods for Identity Based Encryption (IBE). Since identity-based cryptography seems an ideal partner for identity aware devices such as smart-cards, in this paper, we examine the security of concrete pairing instantiations in terms of fault attack.