Improved side channel attacks on pairing based cryptography

Authors:
Johannes Blömer;Peter Günther;Gennadij Liske
Affiliations:
University of Paderborn, Germany;University of Paderborn, Germany;University of Paderborn, Germany
Venue:
COSADE'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Year:
2013

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Abstract

Several known invasive and non-invasive attacks against pairing algorithms only work if the second but not if the first argument of the pairing is the secret. In this paper we extend some of these attacks to the case where the first argument is the secret. Hence we conclude that positioning the secret as the first argument of the pairing does not necessarily improve the security against (SCAs), as it sometimes has been suggested.