Design principles for tamper-resistant smartcard processors
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Physical Techniques for Chip-Backside IC Debug in Nanotechnologies
IEEE Design & Test
Reverse-engineering a cryptographic RFID tag
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Smart Card Handbook
Cryptography with tamperable and leaky memory
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Practical Optical Fault Injection on Secure Microcontrollers
FDTC '11 Proceedings of the 2011 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Optically enhanced position-locked power analysis
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Read-proof hardware from protective coatings
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Private circuits II: keeping secrets in tamperable circuits
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Program obfuscation with leaky hardware
ASIACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Simple photonic emission analysis of AES: photonic side channel analysis for the rest of us
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
FDTC '13 Proceedings of the 2013 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Trustworthy embedded devices
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As the surplus market of failure analysis equipment continues to grow, the cost of performing invasive IC analysis continues to diminish. Hardware vendors in high-security applications utilize security by obscurity to implement layers of protection on their devices. High-security applications must assume that the attacker is skillful, well-equipped and well-funded. Modern security ICs are designed to make readout of decrypted data and changes to security configuration of the device impossible. Countermeasures such as meshes and attack sensors thwart many state of the art attacks. Because of the perceived difficulty and lack of publicly known attacks, the IC backside has largely been ignored by the security community. However, the backside is currently the weakest link in modern ICs because no devices currently on the market are protected against fully-invasive attacks through the IC backside. Fully-invasive backside attacks circumvent all known countermeasures utilized by modern implementations. In this work, we demonstrate the first two practical fully-invasive attacks against the IC backside. Our first attack is fully-invasive backside microprobing. Using this attack we were able to capture decrypted data directly from the data bus of the target IC's CPU core. We also present a fully invasive backside circuit edit. With this attack we were able to set security and configuration fuses of the device to arbitrary values.