Side-channel analysis of PUFs and fuzzy extractors

  • Authors:
  • Dominik Merli;Dieter Schuster;Frederic Stumpf;Georg Sigl

  • Affiliations:
  • Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology, Munich, Germany;Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology, Munich, Germany;Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology, Munich, Germany;Institute for Security in Information Technology, Technische Universität München, Munich, Germany

  • Venue:
  • TRUST'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Embedded security systems based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) offer interesting protection properties, such as tamper resistance and unclonability. However, to establish PUFs as a high security primitive in the long run, their vulnerability to side-channel attacks has to be investigated. For this purpose, we analysed the side-channel leakage of PUF architectures and fuzzy extractor implementations. We identified several attack vectors within common PUF constructions and introduce two side-channel attacks on fuzzy extractors. Our proof-of-concept attack on an FPGA implementation of a fuzzy extractor shows that it is possible to extract the cryptographic key derived from a PUF by side-channel analysis.