An Experimental Study of Security Vulnerabilities Caused by Errors

  • Authors:
  • Jun Xu;Shuo Chen;Zbigniew Kalbarczyk;Ravishankar K. Iyer

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • DSN '01 Proceedings of the 2001 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (formerly: FTCS)
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

Abstract: This paper presents an experimental study which shows that, for the Intel x86 architecture, single-bit control flow errors in the authentication sections of targeted applications can result in significant security vulnerabilities. The experiment targets two well-known Internet server applications: FTP and SSH (secure shell), injecting single-bit control flow errors into user authentication sections of the applications. The injected sections constitute approximately 2-8% of the text segment of the target applications. The results show that out of all activated errors (a) 1-2% compromised system security (create a permanent window of vulnerability), (b) 43-62% resulted in crash failures (about 8.5% of these errors create a transient window of vulnerability), and (c) 7-12% resulted in fail silence violations. A key reason for the measured security vulnerabilities is that, in the x86 architecture, conditional branch instructions are a minimum of one Hamming distance apart. The design and evaluation of a new encoding scheme that reduces or eliminates this problem is presented.