SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Wireless Networks
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Security as a new dimension in embedded system design
Proceedings of the 41st annual Design Automation Conference
Security in embedded systems: Design challenges
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
A pairwise key predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Design principles for tamper-resistant smartcard processors
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
A random perturbation-based scheme for pairwise key establishment in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 8th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
A random perturbation-based scheme for pairwise key establishment in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 8th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
TrueLink: A Practical Countermeasure to the Wormhole Attack in Wireless Networks
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Key Grids: A Protocol Family for Assigning Symmetric Keys
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Evolutionary design of resilient substitution boxes: from coding to hardware implementation
ICES'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Evolvable systems: from biology to hardware
EasiSec: a SoC security coprocessor based on fingerprint-based key management for WSN
International Journal of Sensor Networks
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Recently, System-on-Chip (SoC) technology has been adopted to design smaller, lower-power and cheaper tamper- resistant sensor nodes. In these nodes, we find that there exists a lifetime-secure memory fraction which stores the anterior part of the application executable binary code, namely "fingerprint". We propose a key management protocol based on this secure fingerprint-- FKM. In this protocol, any pair of nodes can build a secret key by combining two raw key elements randomly selected by both nodes from their fingerprints respectively. To further strengthen the security, we also present two multi-dimension grid key reinforcement schemes. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt at the use of application executable binary code itself to develop a key management protocol. A thorough analysis shows that FKM supports higher security and superior operational properties while consuming less memory resource compared to the existing key establishment schemes.