Attacking smart card systems: Theory and practice

  • Authors:
  • Konstantinos Markantonakis;Michael Tunstall;Gerhard Hancke;Ioannis Askoxylakis;Keith Mayes

  • Affiliations:
  • Information Security Group Smart Card Centre, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK;Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Merchant Venturers Building, Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UB, UK;Information Security Group Smart Card Centre, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK;Institute of Computer Science, Foundation for Research and Technology-Hellas, Heraklion, Greece;Information Security Group Smart Card Centre, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK

  • Venue:
  • Information Security Tech. Report
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Smart card technology has evolved over the last few years following notable improvements in the underlying hardware and software platforms. Advanced smart card microprocessors, along with robust smart card operating systems and platforms, contribute towards a broader acceptance of the technology. These improvements have eliminated some of the traditional smart card security concerns. However, researchers and hackers are constantly looking for new issues and vulnerabilities. In this article we provide a brief overview of the main smart card attack categories and their corresponding countermeasures. We also provide examples of well-documented attacks on systems that use smart card technology (e.g. satellite TV, EMV, proximity identification) in an attempt to highlight the importance of the security of the overall system rather than just the smart card.