EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Special Uses and Sbuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Identification Tokens - or: Solving the Chess Grandmaster Problem
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
SECTOR: secure tracking of node encounters in multi-hop wireless networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Practical Attacks on Proximity Identification Systems (Short Paper)
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Physically Unclonable Function-Based Security and Privacy in RFID Systems
PERCOM '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation
Proceedings of the 44th annual Design Automation Conference
Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
SIAM Journal on Computing
Wireless Communications & Mobile Computing
Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys
Communications of the ACM - Security in the Browser
The Swiss-Knife RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
Key Establishment Using Secure Distance Bounding Protocols
MOBIQUITOUS '07 Proceedings of the 2007 Fourth Annual International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking&Services (MobiQuitous)
Attacking smart card systems: Theory and practice
Information Security Tech. Report
RFID Distance Bounding Multistate Enhancement
INDOCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
Optimal security limits of RFID distance bounding protocols
RFIDSec'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Radio frequency identification: security and privacy issues
The Poulidor distance-bounding protocol
RFIDSec'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Radio frequency identification: security and privacy issues
A framework for analyzing RFID distance bounding protocols
Journal of Computer Security - 2010 Workshop on RFID Security (RFIDSec'10 Asia)
RFID-Tags for anti-counterfeiting
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
PUF-enhanced offline RFID security and privacy
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
On the effectiveness of the remanence decay side-channel to clone memory-based PUFs
CHES'13 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are vulnerable to relay attacks (i.e., mafia, terrorist and distance frauds) when they are used for authentication purposes. Distance bounding protocols are particularly designed as a countermeasure against these attacks. These protocols aim to ensure that the tags are in a distant area by measuring the round-trip delays during a rapid challenge-response exchange of short authenticated messages. Terrorist fraud is the most challenging attack to avoid, because a legitimate user (a tag owner) collaborates with an attacker to defeat the authentication system. Many RFID distance bounding protocols have been proposed recently, with encouraging results. However, none of them provides the ideal security against the terrorist fraud. Motivated by this need, we first introduce a strong adversary model for Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based authentication protocol in which the adversary has access to volatile memory of the tag. We show that the security of Sadeghi et al. 's PUF based authentication protocol is not secure in this model. We provide a new technique to improve the security of their protocol. Namely, in our scheme, even if an adversary has access to volatile memory she cannot obtain all long term keys to clone the tag. Next, we propose a novel RFID distance bounding protocol based on PUFs which satisfies the expected security requirements. Comparing to the previous protocols, the use of PUFs in our protocol enhances the system in terms of security, privacy and tag computational overhead. We also prove that our extended protocol with a final signature provides the ideal security against all those frauds, remarkably the terrorist fraud. Besides that, our protocols enjoy the attractive properties of PUFs, which provide the most cost efficient and reliable means to fingerprint chips based on their physical properties.