A framework for analyzing RFID distance bounding protocols

  • Authors:
  • Gildas Avoine;Muhammed Ali Bingöl;Süleyman Kardaş;Cédric Lauradoux;Benjamin Martin

  • Affiliations:
  • (Correspd.) Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium;TUBITAK UEKAE, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey and Institute of Science and Technology, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey;TUBITAK UEKAE, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey and Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey;Université de Lyon, INRIA, INSA-Lyon, CITI, Lyon, France;Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Computer Security - 2010 Workshop on RFID Security (RFIDSec'10 Asia)
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for the RFID technology have been proposed recently. Unfortunately, they are commonly designed without any formal approach, which leads to inaccurate analyzes and unfair comparisons. Motivated by this need, we introduce a unified framework that aims to improve analysis and design of distance bounding protocols. Our framework includes a thorough terminology about the frauds, adversary and prover, thus disambiguating many misleading terms. It also explores the adversary's capabilities and strategies, and addresses the impact of the prover's ability to tamper with his device. It thus introduces some new concepts in the distance bounding domain as the black-box and white-box models, and the relation between the frauds with respect to these models. The relevancy and impact of the framework is finally demonstrated on a study case: Munilla-Peinado distance bounding protocol.