A secure distance-based RFID identification protocol with an off-line back-end database

  • Authors:
  • Pedro Peris-Lopez;Agustin Orfila;Esther Palomar;Julio C. Hernandez-Castro

  • Affiliations:
  • Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics, and Computer Science (EEMCS), Information Security and Privacy Lab, Delft University of Technology (TU-Delft), Delft, The Netherlands 2600 GA;Department of Computer Science, Carlos III University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain 28911;Department of Computer Science, Carlos III University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain 28911;School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK PO1 3HE

  • Venue:
  • Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

The design of a secure RFID identification scheme is a thought-provoking challenge, and this paper deals with this problem adopting a groundbreaking approach. The proposed protocol, called Noent, is based on cryptographic puzzles to avoid the indiscriminate disclose of the confidential information stored on tags and on an innovative role reversal distance-bounding protocol to distinguish between honest and rogue readers. The protocol provides moderate privacy protection (data and location) to single tags but its effectiveness increases hugely when it is used to protect a large population of tags (e.g., protection against inventory disclosure). Moreover, in comparison with classical approaches, Noent does not require an on-line database, which facilitates key updating and mitigates desynchronization attacks.