The Art of Electronics
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Special Uses and Sbuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Secure verification of location claims
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Secure object identification: or: solving the Chess Grandmaster Problem
Proceedings of the 2003 workshop on New security paradigms
SECTOR: secure tracking of node encounters in multi-hop wireless networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Design of a Digital Baseband Processor for UWB Transceiver on RFID Tag
AINAW '07 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops - Volume 02
Attacks on time-of-flight distance bounding channels
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Keep your enemies close: distance bounding against smartcard relay attacks
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
RF-DNA: Radio-Frequency Certificates of Authenticity
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Wireless Communications & Mobile Computing
RFID Distance Bounding Protocol with Mixed Challenges to Prevent Relay Attacks
CANS '09 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security
ID-based secure distance bounding and localization
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Physical-layer identification of RFID devices
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
An asymmetric security mechanism for navigation signals
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
So near and yet so far: distance-bounding attacks in wireless networks
ESAS'06 Proceedings of the Third European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
Distance-Bounding Based Defense Against Relay Attacks in Wireless Networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Secure neighborhood discovery: a fundamental element for mobile ad hoc networking
IEEE Communications Magazine
How secret-sharing can defeat terrorist fraud
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
Location-based security for ID document and ID card enrollment stations
Proceedings of the 14th Communications and Networking Symposium
A formal approach to distance-bounding RFID protocols
ISC'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information security
A secure distance-based RFID identification protocol with an off-line back-end database
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
Security Risks Associated with Radio Frequency Identification in Medical Environments
Journal of Medical Systems
KEDGEN2: A key establishment and derivation protocol for EPC Gen2 RFID systems
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Distance bounding is often proposed as a countermeasure to relay attacks and distance fraud in RFID proximity identification systems. Although several distance-bounding protocols have been proposed the security of these proposals are dependent on the underlying communication channel. Conventional communication channels have been shown to be inappropriate for implementing distance bounding, as these channels introduce latency that can be exploited to obscure attempted attacks. Distance-bounding channels for RFID tokens have been proposed but have failed to address distance fraud or have not been practically implemented in an RFID environment. This paper describes a near-field, bit-exchange channel design that minimizes latency and allows for more secure distance-bounding measurements, while still allowing for a resource-constrained prover. Results from a proof-of-concept implementation is also presented, which illustrates that a channel that is resistant to both relay attacks and distance fraud is feasible in current RFID systems.