A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Field Computation by Moment Methods
Field Computation by Moment Methods
Toward an automated verification of certificates of authenticity
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The exact security of digital signatures-how to sign with RSA and Rabin
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
SIMPL systems, or: can we design cryptographic hardware without secret key information?
SOFSEM'11 Proceedings of the 37th international conference on Current trends in theory and practice of computer science
Design of a secure distance-bounding channel for RFID
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
A survey of system security in contactless electronic passports
Journal of Computer Security
Physically unclonable functions: manufacturing variability as an unclonable device identifier
Proceedings of the 21st edition of the great lakes symposium on Great lakes symposium on VLSI
Security applications of diodes with unique current-voltage characteristics
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Towards electrical, integrated implementations of SIMPL systems
WISTP'10 Proceedings of the 4th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information Security Theory and Practices: security and Privacy of Pervasive Systems and Smart Devices
SIMPL systems as a keyless cryptographic and security primitive
Cryptography and Security
Towards Practical Identification of HF RFID Devices
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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A certificate of authenticity (COA) is an inexpensive physical object that has a random and unique multidimensional structure Swhich is hard to near-exactly replicate. An inexpensive device should be able to scan object's physical "fingerprint," i.e., obtain a set of features in the form of a multidimensional signal x that pseudo-uniquely represents S. For a given "fingerprint" x and without access to S, it should be computationally difficult to construct an object of fixed dimensions with a "fingerprint" y which is at a bounded proximity from x according to a standardized distance metric. We introduce objects that behave as COAs in the electromagnetic field. The objective is to complement RFIDs so that they are physically, not only digitally, unique and hard to replicate. By enabling this feature, we introduce a tag whose information about the product can be read within a relative far-field, and also whose authenticity can be reliably verified within its near-field. In order to counterfeit a tag, the adversary faces two difficulties --- a computational and a manufacturing one. The computational difficulty stems from the hardness of solving linear inverse problems in the electromagnetic field. In order to create an actual tag, the adversary must also manufacture a multidimensional object with a specific three-dimensional topology, dielectric properties, and conductivity.