SIMPL systems, or: can we design cryptographic hardware without secret key information?

  • Authors:
  • Ulrich Rührmair

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, Technische Universität München, Garching

  • Venue:
  • SOFSEM'11 Proceedings of the 37th international conference on Current trends in theory and practice of computer science
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

This paper discusses a new cryptographic primitive termed SIMPL system. Roughly speaking, a SIMPL system is a special type of Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) which possesses a binary description that allows its (slow) public simulation and prediction. Besides this public key like functionality, SIMPL systems have another advantage: No secret information is, or needs to be, contained in SIMPL systems in order to enable cryptographic protocols -- neither in the form of a standard binary key, nor as secret information hidden in random, analog features, as it is the case for PUFs. The cryptographic security of SIMPLs instead rests on (i) a physical assumption on their unclonability, and (ii) a computational assumption regarding the complexity of simulating their output. This novel property makes SIMPL systems potentially immune against many known hardware and software attacks, including malware, side channel, invasive, or modeling attacks.