SIMPL systems, or: can we design cryptographic hardware without secret key information?
SOFSEM'11 Proceedings of the 37th international conference on Current trends in theory and practice of computer science
Security applications of diodes with unique current-voltage characteristics
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
SIMPL systems as a keyless cryptographic and security primitive
Cryptography and Security
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A certificate of authenticity (COA) is an inexpensive physical object with a random and unique structure S which is hard to near-exactly replicate. An inexpensive device should be able to scan object's physical "fingerprint," a set of features that represents S. In this paper, we explore one set of requirements that optical media such as DVDs should satisfy, to be considered as COAs. As manufacturing of such media produces inevitable errors, we use the locations and count of these errors as a "fingerprint" for each optical disc: its optical DNA. The "fingerprint" is signed using publisher's private-key and the resulting signature is stored onto the optical medium using a post-production process. Standard DVD players with altered firmware that includes publisher's public-key, should be able to verify the authenticity of DVDs protected with optical DNA. Our key finding is that for the proposed protocol, only DVDs with exceptional wear-and-tear characteristics would result in an inexpensive and viable anti-counterfeiting technology.