Gate-level characterization: foundations and hardware security applications
Proceedings of the 47th Design Automation Conference
Synthesis of trustable ICs using untrusted CAD tools
Proceedings of the 47th Design Automation Conference
ACM SIGDA Newsletter
FPGA time-bounded unclonable authentication
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
SIMPL systems, or: can we design cryptographic hardware without secret key information?
SOFSEM'11 Proceedings of the 37th international conference on Current trends in theory and practice of computer science
Matched public PUF: ultra low energy security platform
Proceedings of the 17th IEEE/ACM international symposium on Low-power electronics and design
Differential public physically unclonable functions: architecture and applications
Proceedings of the 48th Design Automation Conference
Device aging-based physically unclonable functions
Proceedings of the 48th Design Automation Conference
Securing netlist-level FPGA design through exploiting process variation and degradation
Proceedings of the ACM/SIGDA international symposium on Field Programmable Gate Arrays
SIMPL systems as a keyless cryptographic and security primitive
Cryptography and Security
Wireless security techniques for coordinated manufacturing and on-line hardware trojan detection
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Can EDA combat the rise of electronic counterfeiting?
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
Using standardized quantization for multi-party PPUF matching: foundations and applications
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
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A physically unclonable function (PUF) is a multiple-input, multiple-output, large entropy physical system that is unreproducible due to its structural complexity. A public physically unclonable function (PPUF) is a PUF that is created so that its simulation is feasible but requires very large time even when ample computational resources are available. Using PPUFs, we have developed conceptually new secret key exchange and public key protocols that are resilient against physical and side channel attacks and do not employ unproven mathematical conjectures. Judicious use of PPUF hardware sharing, parallelism, and provably correct partial simulation enables 1016 advantage of communicating parties over an attacker, requiring over 500 of years of computation even if the attacker uses all global computation resources.