Certifying authenticity via fiber-infused paper
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
RF-DNA: Radio-Frequency Certificates of Authenticity
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
An investigative analysis of the security weaknesses in the evolution of RFID enabled passport
International Journal of Internet Technology and Secured Transactions
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A traditional paper-based passport contains a Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and a Visual Inspection Zone (VIZ). The MRZ has two lines of the holder's personal data, some document data, and verification characters encoded using the Optical Character Recognition font B (OCR-B), described in the appendix. The encoded data includes the holder's name, date of birth, and other identifying information for the holder or the document. The VIZ contains the holder's photo and signature, usually on the data page. However, the MRZ and VIZ can be easily duplicated with normal document reproduction technology to produce a fake passport which can pass traditional verification. Neither of these features actively verify the holder's identity; nor do they bind the holder's identity to the document. A passport also contains pages for stamps of visas and of country entry and exit dates, which can be easily altered to produce fake permissions and travel records. The electronic passport, supporting authentication using secure credentials on a tamper-resistant chip, is an attempt to improve on the security of the paper-based passport at minimum cost. This paper surveys the security mechanisms built into the first-generation of authentication mechanisms and compares them with second-generation passports. It analyzes and describes the cryptographic protocols used in Basic Access Control (BAC) and Extended Access Control (EAC).