The security of vehicular ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
ROPE: robust position estimation in wireless sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
A low-cost robust localization scheme for WLAN
WICON '06 Proceedings of the 2nd annual international workshop on Wireless internet
SecNav: secure broadcast localization and time synchronization in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Cross-layer jamming detection and mitigation in wireless broadcast networks
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Securing Wi-Fi networks with position verification: extended version
International Journal of Security and Networks
Keep your enemies close: distance bounding against smartcard relay attacks
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Securing vehicular ad hoc networks
Journal of Computer Security - Special Issue on Security of Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks
Providing VANET security through active position detection
Computer Communications
Attacks on public WLAN-based positioning systems
Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Foot-driven computing: our first glimpse of location privacy issues
SIGSPATIAL Special
ID-based secure distance bounding and localization
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Anti-jamming broadcast communication using uncoordinated spread spectrum techniques
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Jamming-resistant broadcast communication without shared keys
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Secure location verification: a security analysis of GPS signal authentication
DBSec'10 Proceedings of the 24th annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and applications security and privacy
Design of a secure distance-bounding channel for RFID
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Cross-layer jamming detection and mitigation in wireless broadcast networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Formal Reasoning about Physical Properties of Security Protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
On the requirements for successful GPS spoofing attacks
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Survey on location authentication protocols and spatial-temporal attestation services
EUC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing
Location-aware and safer cards: enhancing RFID security and privacy via location sensing
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Wireless security techniques for coordinated manufacturing and on-line hardware trojan detection
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
MSN: mutual secure neighbor verification in multi-hop wireless networks
Security and Communication Networks
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Existing navigation services, such as GPS, offer no signal-integrity (anti-spoof) protection for the general public, especially not with systems for remote attestation of location, where an attacker has easy access to the receiver antenna. With predictable broadcast signals, the antenna can be replaced with a signal generator that simulates a signal as it would be received elsewhere. With a symmetrically encrypted broadcast signal, anyone who can build or reverse engineer a receiver will know the secret key needed to spoof other receivers. Such encryption is only of use in closed user communities (e.g., military) or with highly tamper-resistant modules protecting the common key. In open user communities without common secret keys, integrity protection is needed instead, with properties similar to digital signatures. The ability to verify a navigation signal must be separate from the ability to generate a new one or to apply selective-delay attacks; but simply signing the broadcast signals will not protect their exact relative arrival times. This paper introduces a practical solution based on short-term information hiding.