SeRLoc: secure range-independent localization for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Integrity (I) Codes: Message Integrity Protection and Authentication Over Insecure Channels
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ROPE: robust position estimation in wireless sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
An asymmetric security mechanism for navigation signals
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Secure Time Synchronization in Sensor Networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Zero pre-shared secret key establishment in the presence of jammers
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Attacks on public WLAN-based positioning systems
Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
LOCK: A Highly Accurate, Easy-to-Use Location-Based Access Control System
LoCA '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Location and Context Awareness
Effectiveness of distance-decreasing attacks against impulse radio ranging
Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Wireless network security
ID-based secure distance bounding and localization
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Anti-jamming broadcast communication using uncoordinated spread spectrum techniques
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Jamming-resistant broadcast communication without shared keys
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
On the robustness of IEEE 802.11 rate adaptation algorithms against smart jamming
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
On the capacity of rate-adaptive packetized wireless communication links under jamming
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
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We propose SecNav, a new protocol for securing wireless navigation systems. This protocol secures localization and time synchronization in wireless networks by relying on devices' awareness of presence in the power-range (coverage area) of navigation stations. We perform a detailed security analysis of SecNav and show that, compared to existing secure navigation approaches, it prevents the widest range of attacks on navigation. Our implementation of SecNav, using 802.11b devices, shows that this scheme can be efficiently implemented with existing technologies.