Secure location verification: a security analysis of GPS signal authentication

Authors:
Georg T. Becker;Sherman C. Lo;David S. De Lorenzo;Per K. Enge;Christof Paar
Affiliations:
Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany and University of Massachusetts Amherst;Stanford University;Stanford University;Stanford University;Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
Venue:
DBSec'10 Proceedings of the 24th annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and applications security and privacy
Year:
2010

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Abstract

The use of location based services has increased significantly over the last few years. However, location information is only sparsely used as a security mechanism. One of the reasons for this is the lack of location verification techniques with global coverage. Recently, a new method for authenticating signals from Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) such as GPS or Galileo has been proposed. In this paper, we analyze the security of this signal authentication mechanism and show how it can be used to establish a secure location verification service with global coverage. This new security service can be used to increase the security of various different applications, even if they are not directly connected to navigation or positioning.