EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Protocols for RFID tag/reader authentication
Decision Support Systems
How secret-sharing can defeat terrorist fraud
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
Rational distance-bounding protocols over noisy channel
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security of information and networks
A secure distance-based RFID identification protocol with an off-line back-end database
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
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Distance bounding protocols are an effective countermeasure against relay attacks including distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. Reid et al. proposed the first symmetric key distance bounding protocol against mafia and terrorist fraud attacks [1]. However, [2] claims that this is only achieved with a (7/8)n probability of success for mafia fraud, rather than the theoretical value of (3/4)n (for n rounds) achieved by distance bounding protocols without a final signature. We prove that the mafia fraud attack success using the Reid et al. protocol is bounded by (3/4)n and reduces as noise increases. The proof can be of further interest as it is the first - to the best of our knowledge - detailed analysis of the effects of communication errors on the security of a distance bounding protocol.