Weakly Secret Bit Commitment: Applications to Lotteries and Fair Exchange
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Formal Analysis of Syverson's Rational Exchange Protocol
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Handbook of Mathematical Functions, With Formulas, Graphs, and Mathematical Tables,
Handbook of Mathematical Functions, With Formulas, Graphs, and Mathematical Tables,
An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Authenticating ad hoc networks by comparison of short digests
Information and Computation
Reid et al.'s distance bounding protocol and mafia fraud attacks over noisy channels
IEEE Communications Letters
Authentication protocols based on low-bandwidth unspoofable channels: A comparative survey
Journal of Computer Security
Rational distance-bounding protocols over noisy channel
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security of information and networks
Rational secret sharing, revisited
SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Rational distance-bounding protocols over noisy channel
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security of information and networks
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We use ideas from game theory to define a new notion for an optimal threshold for the number of erroneous responses that occur during the rapid-bit exchange over noisy channels in a distance-bounding protocol. The optimal threshold will ensure that even if an intruder attacks the protocol, the expected loss the verifier suffers will still be lower than when the intruder does not attack. Any rational intruder, who always tries to maximise the verifier's loss, will not therefore have any incentive to attack the protocol. We then demonstrate how statistical analysis and binary search are used to locate the unique and optimal threshold accurately.