Checking Before Output May Not Be Enough Against Fault-Based Cryptanalysis
IEEE Transactions on Computers
The Design of Rijndael
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Designing Resistant Circuits against Malicious Faults Injection Using Asynchronous Logic
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Design principles for tamper-resistant smartcard processors
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Case study of a fault attack on asynchronous DES crypto-processors
FDTC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Fault based collision attacks on AES
FDTC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
AES'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Advanced Encryption Standard
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Differential Fault Analysis on DES Middle Rounds
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Design and characterisation of an AES chip embedding countermeasures
International Journal of Intelligent Engineering Informatics
When clocks fail: on critical paths and clock faults
CARDIS'10 Proceedings of the 9th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Application
Combined fault and side-channel attack on protected implementations of AES
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
This paper describes an attack on cryptographic devices called Differential Behavioral Analysis (or DBA). This is an hybrid attack between two already powerful attacks: differential power analysis (DPA) for the statistical treatment and safe-error attack for the fault type. DBA, simulated on an algorithmic model of AES appears to be very efficient. The attacker is able to recover the entire secret key with byte-wise "stuck-at" faults injected repetitively. A theorical as well as a more realistic approach are presented.