Elliptic curves in cryptography
Elliptic curves in cryptography
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Checking Before Output May Not Be Enough Against Fault-Based Cryptanalysis
IEEE Transactions on Computers
A Practical Implementation of the Timing Attack
CARDIS '98 Proceedings of the The International Conference on Smart Card Research and Applications
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
A Parity Code Based Fault Detection for an Implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard
DFT '02 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault-Tolerance in VLSI Systems
Smartly Analyzing the Simplicity and the Power of Simple Power Analysis on Smartcards
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
An Implementation of DES and AES, Secure against Some Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Optical Fault Induction Attacks
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Evaluating the robustness of secure triple track logic through prototyping
Proceedings of the 21st annual symposium on Integrated circuits and system design
Differential Behavioral Analysis
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Implementing virtual secure circuit using a custom-instruction approach
CASES '10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Compilers, architectures and synthesis for embedded systems
IOLTS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 16th International On-Line Testing Symposium
Automated design of cryptographic devices resistant to multiple side-channel attacks
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A comparative cost/security analysis of fault attack countermeasures
FDTC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
AES'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Advanced Encryption Standard
The “backend duplication” method
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
When clocks fail: on critical paths and clock faults
CARDIS'10 Proceedings of the 9th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Application
Virus in a smart card: Myth or reality?
Journal of Information Security and Applications
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In critical communication infrastructures, hardware accelerators are often used to speed up cryptographic calculations. Their resistance to physical attacks determines how secure the overall infrastructure is. In this paper, we describe the implementation and characterisation of an AES accelerator embedding security features against physical attacks. This AES chip is implemented in HCMOS9gp 130 nm STM technology. The countermeasure is based on duplication and works on complemented values in parallel. The chip was tested against side channel attacks showing the efficiency of the proposed countermeasure against such attacks. Fault injection tests based on the use of local laser shoots showed that the fault detection mechanism did indeed react as expected. However, using clock set-up time violations, 80% of the secret key were retrieved in less than 40 hours, thus illustrating the limits of the duplication countermeasure against a global fault attack which was published after the chip was designed.