Case study of a fault attack on asynchronous DES crypto-processors

  • Authors:
  • Yannick Monnet;Marc Renaudin;Régis Leveugle;Christophe Clavier;Pascal Moitrel

  • Affiliations:
  • TIMA Laboratory, Grenoble, France;TIMA Laboratory, Grenoble, France;TIMA Laboratory, Grenoble, France;Gemalto La Vigie, La Ciotat, France;Gemalto La Vigie, La Ciotat, France

  • Venue:
  • FDTC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

This paper proposes a practical fault attack on two asynchronous DES crypto-processors, a reference version and a hardened version, using round reduction. Because of their specific architecture, asynchronous circuits have a very specific behavior in the presence of faults. Previous works show that they are an interesting alternative to design robust systems. However, this paper demonstrates that there are weaknesses left, and that we are able both to identify and exploit them. The effect of the fault is to reduce the number of rounds by corrupting the multi-rail round counter protected by alarm cells. The fault injection mean is a laser. A description of the fault injection process is presented, followed by how the results can be used to retrieve the key. Weaknesses are theoretically identified and analyzed. Finally, possible counter-measures are described.