CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Probing Attacks on Tamper-Resistant Devices
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Design principles for tamper-resistant smartcard processors
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
On the Duality of Probing and Fault Attacks
Journal of Electronic Testing: Theory and Applications
Probing attacks on multi-agent systems using electronic institutions
DALT'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies
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The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) defines the most popular block cipher. It is commonly used and often implemented on smart cards. In this paper, we show how a 128-bit AES key can be retrieved by microprobing. Thereby, a probe is placed onto the chip to spy on inner values. Watching one arbitrary bit of the AES State during the first two rounds of about 210 encryptions is enough to reveal the whole key. For special positions of the probe, this number can be reduced to 168. The paper demonstrates that even few information is sufficient for a successful attack on AES.