Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
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SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart Cards
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On Differential and Linear Crytoanalysis of the RC5 Encryption Algorithm
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Robustness Principles for Public Key Protocols
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
How to Protect DES Against Exhaustive Key Search
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Improved Differential Attacks on RC5
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
New Results in Linear Cryptanalysis of RC5
FSE '98 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Evaluating Differential Fault Analysis of Unknown Cryptosystems
PKC '99 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secure and Private Distribution of Online Video and Some Related Cryptographic Issues
ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
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CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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Programming methodology
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Ambient intelligence
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A random perturbation-based scheme for pairwise key establishment in sensor networks
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An overview of side channel analysis attacks
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This paper describes a new type of attack on tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware. We show that by locally observing the value of a few RAM or adress bus bits (possibly a single one) during the execution of a cryptographic algorithm, typically by the mean of a probe (needle), an attacker could easily recover information on the secret key being used; our attacks apply to public-key cryptosystems such as RSA or El Gamal, as well as to secret-key encryption schemes including DES and RC5.