Robustness Principles for Public Key Protocols
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Breaking Public Key Cryptosystems on Tamper Resistant Devices in the Presence of Transient Faults
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Probing Attacks on Tamper-Resistant Devices
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Secret External Encodings Do Not Prevent Transient Fault Analysis
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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Recently [1], Biham and Shamir announced an attack (Differential Fault Analysis, DFA for short) that recovers keys of arbitrary cryptosystems in polynomial (quadratic) complexity. In this paper, we show that under slightly modified assumptions, DFA is not polynomial and would simply result in the loss of some key-bits. Additionally, we prove the existence of cryptosystems on which DFA cannot reach the announced workfactor.