On hiding information form an oracle
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
On the construction of pseudo-random permutations: Luby-Rackoff revisited (extended abstract)
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Probing Attacks on Tamper-Resistant Devices
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
IPA: A New Class of Power Attacks
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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Side channel cryptanalytic techniques, such as the analysis of instantaneous power consumption, have been extremely effective in attacking cryptographic implementations on simple hardware platforms. The significant economic ramifications of such attacks, especially on the smart card market, have spurred a scramble for countermeasures. Unfortunately, most of the proposed countermeasures are ad hoc and ineffective. This is largely due to the absence of a sound scientific basis for understanding side channel information leakage resulting in the lack of a methodology for designing and validating proposed countermeasures.A more scientific approach to the problem is to create a model for the power consumption characteristics of the device, and then design implementations that are provably secure in that model, i.e. they resist generic attacks with an a priori bound on the number of experiments. We propose such a model for power consumption and a generic programming technique to create provably secure implementations. We expect that this formal model will become the basis for further work in this area.