The VERILOG Hardware Description Language
The VERILOG Hardware Description Language
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
FC '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Protecting Smart Cards from Passive Power Analysis with Detached Power Supplies
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Smartly Analyzing the Simplicity and the Power of Simple Power Analysis on Smartcards
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Investigations of power analysis attacks on smartcards
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
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Within the context of secure applications, side channel attacks are a major threat. The main characteristic of these attacks is that they exploit physical syndromes, such as power consumption rather than Boolean data. Among all the known side channel attacks the differential power analysis appears as one of the most efficient. This attack constitutes the main topic of this paper. More precisely, a design oriented modelling of the syndrome (signature) obtained while performing Differential Power Analysis of Kocher is introduced. As a validation of this model, it is shown how it allows identifying the leaking nets and gates during the logical synthesis step. The technology considered herein is a 130nm process.