Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
A Practical Implementation of the Timing Attack
CARDIS '98 Proceedings of the The International Conference on Smart Card Research and Applications
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Timing Attack against RSA with the Chinese Remainder Theorem
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Cryptanalysis of short secret exponents modulo RSA primes
Information Sciences—Informatics and Computer Science: An International Journal
Improving Brumley and Boneh timing attack on unprotected SSL implementations
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Opportunities and Limits of Remote Timing Attacks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Remote timing attacks are practical
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Web security
Fault-based attack of RSA authentication
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
New results on instruction cache attacks
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
A CRT-based RSA countermeasure against physical cryptanalysis
HPCC'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on High Performance Computing and Communications
Smart Cards: Side-channel attacks on smartcards
Network Security
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In timing attack, a class of side channel attack, the attacker attempts to break a cryptographic algorithm by timing the operations of a specific system. Several studies on different types of timing attacks have been published, but they are either theoretical or hard to put into practice. To improve the feasibility of timing attack, the current study proposes an improved timing attack scheme on RSA-CRT using t-test. Some similar types of timing attacks, such as BB-attack and Schindler's attack, have been previously reported. However, none of these studies has applied these statistical methods with such efficiency, or has actually obtained complete recovery by attacking on RSA-CRT. The algorithm proposed in the present study provides an error detection mechanism and correction strategy that can detect and correct the erroneous decision of guessing q"k. With an improvement timing attack on the RSA algorithm in OpenSSL, the 0-1gap is enlarged, the neighborhood size is reduced, and the precision of the decision is improved. Moreover, obtaining the factor q is practical, and even recovers a 1024-bit RSA key completely for an interprocess timing attack.