A CRT-based RSA countermeasure against physical cryptanalysis

  • Authors:
  • ChangKyun Kim;JaeCheol Ha;SangJae Moon;Sung-Ming Yen;Sung-Hyun Kim

  • Affiliations:
  • National Security Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea;Korea Nazarene Univ., Cheonan, Choongnam, Korea;Kyungpook National Univ., Daegu, Korea;National Central Univ., Chung-Li, Taiwan, R.O.C;System LSI Division, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Korea

  • Venue:
  • HPCC'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on High Performance Computing and Communications
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

This paper considers a secure and practical CRT-based RSA signature implementation against both side channel attacks (including power analysis attack, timing attack, and most specially the recent MRED attack) as well as the various CRT-based fault attacks. Moreover, the proposed countermeasure can resist C safe-error attack which can be mounted in many existing good countermeasures. To resist side-channel attack, a special design of random message blinding is employed. On the other hand, a countermeasure based on the idea of fault diffusion is developed to protect the implementation against the powerful CRT-based fault attacks.