Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels

  • Authors:
  • Aslan Askarov;Danfeng Zhang;Andrew C. Myers

  • Affiliations:
  • Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA;Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA;Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

We investigate techniques for general black-box mitigation of timing channels. The source of events is wrapped by a timing mitigator that delays output events so that they contain only a bounded amount of information. We introduce a general class of timing mitigators that can achieve any given bound on timing channel leakage, with a tradeoff in system performance. We show these mitigators compose well with other mechanisms for information flow control, and demonstrate they are effective against some known timing attacks.