On the nonstationarity of Internet traffic
Proceedings of the 2001 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Hiding Data in the OSI Network Model
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Traffic Modelling for Fast Action Network Games
Multimedia Tools and Applications
IP covert timing channels: design and detection
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On the Secrecy of Timing-Based Active Watermarking Trace-Back Techniques
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
Detecting covert timing channels: an entropy-based approach
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Network covert channels: design, analysis, detection, and elimination
Network covert channels: design, analysis, detection, and elimination
Covert messaging through TCP timestamps
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Embedding covert channels into TCP/IP
IH'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Hiding
An information-theoretic and game-theoretic study of timing channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Robust and undetectable steganographic timing channels for i.i.d. traffic
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
Stealthier inter-packet timing covert channels
NETWORKING'11 Proceedings of the 10th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part I
Covert channels in multiple access protocols
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
CoCo: coding-based covert timing channels for network flows
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
Cirripede: circumvention infrastructure using router redirection with plausible deniability
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Predictive mitigation of timing channels in interactive systems
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Mimic: An active covert channel that evades regularity-based detection
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
IFDB: decentralized information flow control for databases
Proceedings of the 8th ACM European Conference on Computer Systems
SoNIC: precise realtime software access and control of wired networks
nsdi'13 Proceedings of the 10th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
PHY covert channels: can you see the idles?
NSDI'14 Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Covert timing channels aim at transmitting hidden messages by controlling the time between transmissions of consecutive payload packets in overt network communication. Previous results used encoding mechanisms that are either easy to detect with statistical analysis, thus spoiling the purpose of a covert channel, and/or are highly sensitive to channel noise, rendering them useless in practice. In this paper, we introduce a novel covert timing channel which allows to balance undetectability and robustness: i) the encoded message is modulated in the inter-packet delay of the underlying overt communication channel such that the statistical properties of regular traffic can be closely approximated and ii) the underlying encoding employs spreading techniques to provide robustness. We experimentally validate the effectiveness of our approach by establishing covert channels over on-line gaming traffic. The experimental results show that our covert timing channel can achieve strong robustness and undetectability, by varying the data transmission rate.