Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A note on the confinement problem
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Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers
ESORICS '98 Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
A Case Study Of Two Nrl Pump Prototypes
ACSAC '96 Proceedings of the 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A Practical Approach to Identifying Storage and Timing Channels: Twenty Years Later
ACSAC '02 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
The Influence of Delay Upon an Idealized Channel's Bandwidth
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Capacity estimation and auditability of network covert channels
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PlanetLab: an overlay testbed for broad-coverage services
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
IP covert timing channels: design and detection
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Spectroscopy of traceroute delays
PAM'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Reliable communication over channels with insertions, deletions, and substitutions
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
An information-theoretic and game-theoretic study of timing channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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Detecting covert timing channels: an entropy-based approach
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Model-Based Covert Timing Channels: Automated Modeling and Evasion
RAID '08 Proceedings of the 11th international symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
A new cell counter based attack against tor
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hide and seek in time: robust covert timing channels
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
WebProphet: automating performance prediction for web services
NSDI'10 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Networked systems design and implementation
Covert channels through external interference
WOOT'09 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference on Offensive technologies
A potential HTTP-based application-level attack against Tor
Future Generation Computer Systems
Security analysis of India's electronic voting machines
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Robust and undetectable steganographic timing channels for i.i.d. traffic
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
Compromise through USB-based Hardware Trojan Horse device
Future Generation Computer Systems
Stealthier inter-packet timing covert channels
NETWORKING'11 Proceedings of the 10th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part I
CoCo: coding-based covert timing channels for network flows
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
Cirripede: circumvention infrastructure using router redirection with plausible deniability
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Predictive mitigation of timing channels in interactive systems
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Network covert channels on the Android platform
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
Whispers in the hyper-space: high-speed covert channel attacks in the cloud
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Security analysis of smartphone point-of-sale systems
WOOT'12 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Offensive Technologies
Cloak: a ten-fold way for reliable covert communications
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Mimic: An active covert channel that evades regularity-based detection
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
From an IP address to a street address: using wireless signals to locate a target
WOOT'13 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Offensive Technologies
VoIP steganography and its Detection—A survey
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
PHY covert channels: can you see the idles?
NSDI'14 Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
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This paper introduces JitterBugs, a class of inline interception mechanisms that covertly transmit data by perturbing the timing of input events likely to affect externally observable network traffic. JitterBugs positioned at input devices deep within the trusted environment (e.g., hidden in cables or connectors) can leak sensitive data without compromising the host or its software. In particular, we show a practical Keyboard JitterBug that solves the data exfiltration problem for keystroke loggers by leaking captured passwords through small variations in the precise times at which keyboard events are delivered to the host. Whenever an interactive communication application (such as SSH, Telnet, instant messaging, etc) is running, a receiver monitoring the host's network traffic can recover the leaked data, even when the session or link is encrypted. Our experiments suggest that simple Keyboard JitterBugs can be a practical technique for capturing and exfiltrating typed secrets under conventional OSes and interactive network applications, even when the receiver is many hops away on the Internet.