USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
TaintDroid: an information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones
OSDI'10 Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Operating systems design and implementation
How to Shop for Free Online -- Security Analysis of Cashier-as-a-Service Based Web Stores
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
TouchLogger: inferring keystrokes on touch screen from smartphone motion
HotSec'11 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
All your droid are belong to us: a survey of current android attacks
WOOT'11 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Offensive technologies
A survey of mobile malware in the wild
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices
Detecting repackaged smartphone applications in third-party android marketplaces
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
SP '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
FIE on firmware: finding vulnerabilities in embedded systems using symbolic execution
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
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We experimentally investigate the security of several smartphone point-of-sale (POS) systems that consist of a software application combined with an audio-jack magnetic stripe reader (AMSR). The latter is a small hardware dongle that reads magnetic stripes on payment cards, (sometimes) encrypts the sensitive card data, and transmits the result to the application. Our main technical result is a complete break of a feature-rich AMSR with encryption support. We show how an arbitrary application running on the phone can permanently disable the AMSR, extract the cryptographic keys it uses to protect cardholder data, or gain the privileged access needed to upload new firmware to it.