A framework model for grid security
Future Generation Computer Systems
Editorial: Special section: Security on grids and distributed systems
Future Generation Computer Systems
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
Predictable Design of Network-Based Covert Communication Systems
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hardware Trojan Detection and Isolation Using Current Integration and Localized Current Analysis
DFT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance of VLSI Systems
Secure on-demand grid computing
Future Generation Computer Systems
Structure design and test of enterprise security management system with advanced internal security
Future Generation Computer Systems
Experiences in Hardware Trojan design and implementation
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
New design strategy for improving hardware Trojan detection and reducing Trojan activation time
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Hardware Trojan Horse Device Based on Unintended USB Channels
NSS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Third International Conference on Network and System Security
Editorial: Special Section: Trusted computing
Future Generation Computer Systems
Spy vs. Spy: counter-intelligence methods for backtracking malicious intrusions
Proceedings of the 2011 Conference of the Center for Advanced Studies on Collaborative Research
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This paper continues the discussion of the risks posed by Hardware Trojan Horse devices by detailing research efforts to build such a Hardware Trojan Horse based on unintended USB channels. Because of the ubiquitousness of the USB protocol in contemporary computer systems, the research focused on identifying, characterizing and modeling unintended USB channels. The research demonstrated that such unintended USB channels can allow the creation of two way communications with a targeted network endpoint, thus violating the integrity and confidentiality of the data residing on the network endpoint. The work was validated through the design and implementation of a Proof of Concept Hardware Trojan that uses two such unintended USB channels to successfully interact with a target network endpoint to compromise and exfiltrate data from it.