MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Compromise through USB-based Hardware Trojan Horse device
Future Generation Computer Systems
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Reflections on Trust in Devices: An Informal Survey of Human Trust in an Internet-of-Things Context
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
Hardware trojans for inducing or amplifying side-channel leakage of cryptographic software
INTRUST'10 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trusted Systems
VeriTrust: verification for hardware trust
Proceedings of the 50th Annual Design Automation Conference
Post-deployment trust evaluation in wireless cryptographic ICs
DATE '12 Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Hardware trojan resistant computation using heterogeneous COTS processors
ACSC '13 Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Australasian Computer Science Conference - Volume 135
Hardware trojan design and detection: a practical evaluation
Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
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We report our experiences in designing and implementing several hardware Trojans within the framework of the Embedded System Challenge competition that was held as part of the Cyber Security Awareness Week (CSAW) at the Polytechnic Institute of New York University in October 2008. Due to the globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) manufacturing industry, hardware Trojans constitute an increasingly probable threat to both commercial and military applications. With traditional testing methods falling short in the quest of finding hardware Trojans, several specialized detection methods have surfaced. To facilitate research in this area, a better understanding of what Hardware Trojans would look like and what impact they would incur to an IC is required. To this end, we present eight distinct attack techniques employing Register Transfer Level (RTL) hardware Trojans to compromise the security of an Alpha encryption module implemented on a Digilent BASYS Spartan-3 FPGA board. Our work, which earned second place in the aforementioned competition, demonstrates that current RTL designs are, indeed, quite vulnerable to hardware Trojan attacks.