Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Towards trojan-free trusted ICs: problem analysis and detection scheme
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe
Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Sensitivity analysis to hardware Trojans using power supply transient signals
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
At-speed delay characterization for IC authentication and Trojan Horse detection
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Detecting malicious inclusions in secure hardware: Challenges and solutions
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
A region based approach for the identification of hardware Trojans
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
On-demand transparency for improving hardware Trojan detectability
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Hardware Trojan detection using path delay fingerprint
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Experiences in Hardware Trojan design and implementation
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Performance of delay-based Trojan detection techniques under parameter variations
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
VITAMIN: Voltage inversion technique to ascertain malicious insertions in ICs
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Self-referencing: a scalable side-channel approach for hardware Trojan detection
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
A unified submodular framework for multimodal IC Trojan detection
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
Effect of malicious hardware logic on circuit reliability
VDAT'12 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Progress in VLSI Design and Test
Breakthrough silicon scanning discovers backdoor in military chip
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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Trust in reference to integrated circuits addresses the concern that the design and/or fabrication of the integrated circuit (IC) may be purposely altered by an adversary. The insertion of a hardware Trojan involves a deliberate and malicious change to an IC that adds or removes functionality or reduces its reliability. Trojans are designed to disable and/or destroy the IC at some future time or they may serve to leak confidential information covertly to the adversary. Trojans can be cleverly hidden by the adversary to make it extremely difficult for chip validation processes, such as manufacturing test, to accidentally discover them. This paper investigates the sensitivity of a power supply transient signal analysis method for detecting Trojans. In particular, we focus on determining the smallest detectable Trojan, i.e., the least number of gates a Trojan may have and still be detected, using a set of process simulation models that characterize a TSMC 0.18 µm process. We also evaluate the sensitivity of our Trojan detection method in the presence of measurement noise and background switching activity.