Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Trojan Side-Channels: Lightweight Hardware Trojans through Side-Channel Engineering
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
MERO: A Statistical Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Consistency-based characterization for IC Trojan detection
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Gate-level characterization: foundations and hardware security applications
Proceedings of the 47th Design Automation Conference
Self-referencing: a scalable side-channel approach for hardware Trojan detection
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Detecting Trojans through leakage current analysis using multiple supply pad IDDQS
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
A unified submodular framework for multimodal IC Trojan detection
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Wireless security techniques for coordinated manufacturing and on-line hardware trojan detection
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Effect of malicious hardware logic on circuit reliability
VDAT'12 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Progress in VLSI Design and Test
Breakthrough silicon scanning discovers backdoor in military chip
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Experimental analysis of a ring oscillator network for hardware trojan detection in a 90nm ASIC
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Provably complete hardware trojan detection using test point insertion
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Energy attacks and defense techniques for wireless systems
Proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on Security and privacy in wireless and mobile networks
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Scalable hardware trojan diagnosis
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Detection of trojans using a combined ring oscillator network and off-chip transient power analysis
ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems (JETC)
FANCI: identification of stealthy malicious logic using boolean functional analysis
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Outsourcing of SoC fabrication units has created the potential threat of design tampering using hardware Trojans. Methods based on side-channel analysis exist to differentiate such maligned ICs from the genuine ones but process variation in the foundries limit the effectiveness of such approaches. In this work, we propose a circuit partition based approach to detect and locate the embedded Trojan. Results show that our approach is effective in separating out candidate Trojans in the circuit. In addition, we provide a power profile based method for refining the candidate regions that may contain a Trojan. In many cases, such an isolation method leads to noticeable manifestation of the anomalous behavior of the circuit due to the presence of the Trojan thereby enhancing chances of their detection.