Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Consistency-based characterization for IC Trojan detection
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
A Trojan-resistant system-on-chip bus architecture
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
Detecting Trojans through leakage current analysis using multiple supply pad IDDQS
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Experimental analysis of a ring oscillator network for hardware trojan detection in a 90nm ASIC
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
High-sensitivity hardware trojan detection using multimodal characterization
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Detection of trojans using a combined ring oscillator network and off-chip transient power analysis
ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems (JETC)
Post-deployment trust evaluation in wireless cryptographic ICs
DATE '12 Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
A sensor-assisted self-authentication framework for hardware trojan detection
DATE '12 Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Hardware Trojans in wireless cryptographic ICs: silicon demonstration & detection method evaluation
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
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Trust in reference to integrated circuits addresses the concern that the design and/or fabrication of the IC may be purposely altered by an adversary. The insertion of a hardware Trojan involves a deliberate and malicious change to an IC that adds or removes functionality or reduces its reliability. Trojans are designed to disable and/or destroy the IC at some future time or they may serve to leak confidential information covertly to the adversary. Trojans are cleverly hidden by the adversary to make it extremely difficult for chip validation processes, such as manufacturing test, to accidentally discover them. This paper investigates a power supply transient signal analysis method for detecting Trojans that is based on the analysis of multiple power port signals. In particular, we focus on determining the smallest detectable Trojan in a set of process simulation models that characterize a TSMC 0.18 um process.