Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Sensitivity analysis to hardware Trojans using power supply transient signals
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Hardware Trojan detection using path delay fingerprint
HST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Hardware Trojans in Wireless Cryptographic ICs
IEEE Design & Test
Self-referencing: a scalable side-channel approach for hardware Trojan detection
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
A Unified Framework for Multimodal Submodular Integrated Circuits Trojan Detection
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE Spectrum
High-sensitivity hardware trojan detection using multimodal characterization
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
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We present a silicon implementation of a hardware Trojan, which is capable of leaking the secret key of a wireless cryptographic integrated circuit (IC) consisting of an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) core and an Ultra-Wide-Band (UWB) transmitter. With its impact carefully hidden in the transmission specification margins allowed for process variations, this hardware Trojan cannot be detected by production testing methods of either the digital or the analog part of the IC and does not violate the transmission protocol or any system-level specifications. Nevertheless, the informed adversary, who knows what to look for in the transmission power waveform, is capable of retrieving the 128-bit AES key, which is leaked with every 128-bit ciphertext block sent by the UWB transmitter. Using silicon measurements from 40 chips fabricated in TSMC's 0.35μm technology, we also assess the effectiveness of a side channel-based statistical analysis method in detecting this hardware Trojan.