Wireless security techniques for coordinated manufacturing and on-line hardware trojan detection
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Hardware Trojan horse benchmark via optimal creation and placement of malicious circuitry
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
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VDAT'12 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Progress in VLSI Design and Test
Provably complete hardware trojan detection using test point insertion
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Energy attacks and defense techniques for wireless systems
Proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on Security and privacy in wireless and mobile networks
High-sensitivity hardware trojan detection using multimodal characterization
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Hardware Trojans in wireless cryptographic ICs: silicon demonstration & detection method evaluation
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Temperature tracking: an innovative run-time approach for hardware Trojan detection
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Hardware security: threat models and metrics
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
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This paper presents a unified formal framework for integrated circuits (ICs) Trojan detection that can simultaneously employ multiple noninvasive side-channel measurement types (modalities). After formally defining the IC Trojan detection for each side-channel measurement and analyzing the complexity, we devise a new submodular formulation of the problem objective function. Based on the objective function properties, an efficient Trojan detection method with strong approximation and optimality guarantees is introduced. Signal processing methods for calibrating the impact of interchip and intrachip correlations are presented. We define a new sensitivity metric that formally quantifies the impact of modifications to each existing gate that is affected by Trojan. Using the new metric, we compare the Trojan detection capability of different measurement types for static (quiescent) current, dynamic (transient) current, and timing (delay) side-channel measurements. We propose four methods for combining the detection results that are gained from different measurement modalities and show how the sensitivity results can be used for a systematic combining of the detection results. Experimental evaluations on benchmark designs reveal the low-overhead and effectiveness of the new Trojan detection framework and provides a comparison of different detection combining methods.