Hardware Trojan horse benchmark via optimal creation and placement of malicious circuitry

  • Authors:
  • Sheng Wei;Kai Li;Farinaz Koushanfar;Miodrag Potkonjak

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California, Los Angeles, CA;Rice University, Houston, TX;Rice University, Houston, TX;University of California, Los Angeles, CA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

This paper proposes Hardware Trojan (HT) placement techniques that yield challenging HT detection benchmarks. We develop three types of one-gate HT benchmarks based on switching power, leakage power, and delay measurements that are commonly used in HT detection. In particular, we employ an iterative searching algorithm to find rarely switching locations, an aging-based approach to create ultra-low power HT, and a backtracking-based reconvergence identification method to determine the non-observable delay paths. The simulation results indicate that our HT attack benchmarks provide the most challenging representative test cases for the evaluation of side-channel based HT detection techniques.