Designing and implementing malicious hardware
LEET'08 Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats
Towards trojan-free trusted ICs: problem analysis and detection scheme
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe
CPU Bugs, CPU Backdoors and Consequences on Security
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Trojan Side-Channels: Lightweight Hardware Trojans through Side-Channel Engineering
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
MERO: A Statistical Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Analysis and mitigation of process variation impacts on Power-Attack Tolerance
Proceedings of the 46th Annual Design Automation Conference
Hardware authentication leveraging performance limits in detailed simulations and emulations
Proceedings of the 46th Annual Design Automation Conference
Hardware Trojan horse detection using gate-level characterization
Proceedings of the 46th Annual Design Automation Conference
Security against hardware Trojan through a novel application of design obfuscation
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Consistency-based characterization for IC Trojan detection
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
The detection of Trojan horse based on the data mining
FSKD'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Fuzzy systems and knowledge discovery - Volume 1
SeReCon: a secure reconfiguration controller for self-reconfigurable systems
International Journal of Critical Computer-Based Systems
Gate-level characterization: foundations and hardware security applications
Proceedings of the 47th Design Automation Conference
A Trojan-resistant system-on-chip bus architecture
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
Detecting/preventing information leakage on the memory bus due to malicious hardware
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Self-referencing: a scalable side-channel approach for hardware Trojan detection
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Detecting Trojans through leakage current analysis using multiple supply pad IDDQS
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
A unified submodular framework for multimodal IC Trojan detection
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Security implications of crosstalk in switching CMOS gates
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
Proceedings of the 19th ACM/SIGDA international symposium on Field programmable gate arrays
SoC: a real platform for IP reuse, IP infringement, and IP protection
VLSI Design - Special issue on CAD for Gigascale SoC Design and Verification Solutions
Hardware Trojan side-channels based on physical unclonable functions
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
DISTROY: detecting integrated circuit Trojans with compressive measurements
HotSec'11 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Scalable segmentation-based malicious circuitry detection and diagnosis
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Hardware trojans for inducing or amplifying side-channel leakage of cryptographic software
INTRUST'10 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trusted Systems
Wireless security techniques for coordinated manufacturing and on-line hardware trojan detection
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Hardware Trojan horse benchmark via optimal creation and placement of malicious circuitry
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
Breakthrough silicon scanning discovers backdoor in military chip
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Experimental analysis of a ring oscillator network for hardware trojan detection in a 90nm ASIC
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Taxonomy for description of cross-domain attacks on CPS
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international conference on High confidence networked systems
Is split manufacturing secure?
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
High-sensitivity hardware trojan detection using multimodal characterization
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Reverse engineering digital circuits using functional analysis
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Red team vs. blue team hardware trojan analysis: detection of a hardware trojan on an actual ASIC
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
VeriTrust: verification for hardware trust
Proceedings of the 50th Annual Design Automation Conference
Scalable hardware trojan diagnosis
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Detection of trojans using a combined ring oscillator network and off-chip transient power analysis
ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems (JETC)
Post-deployment trust evaluation in wireless cryptographic ICs
DATE '12 Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
FANCI: identification of stealthy malicious logic using boolean functional analysis
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Towards reducing the attack surface of software backdoors
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Hardware trojan design and detection: a practical evaluation
Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Stealthy dopant-level hardware trojans
CHES'13 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
Sapper: a language for hardware-level security policy enforcement
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Hardware Trojans in wireless cryptographic ICs: silicon demonstration & detection method evaluation
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Hardware security: threat models and metrics
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
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Hardware manufacturers are increasingly outsourcing their IC fabrication work overseas due to their much lower cost structure. This poses a significant security risk for ICs used for critical military and business applications. Attackers can exploit this loss of control to substitute Trojan ICs for genuine ones or insert a Trojan circuit into the design or mask used for fabrication. We show that a technique borrowed from side-channel cryptanalysis can be used to mitigate this problem. Our approach uses noise modeling to construct a set of fingerprints for an IC family utilizing sidechannel information such as power, temperature, and electromagnetic (EM) profiles. The set of fingerprints can be developed using a few ICs from a batch and only these ICs would have to be invasively tested to ensure that they were all authentic. The remaining ICs are verified using statistical tests against the fingerprints. We describe the theoretical framework and present preliminary experimental results to show that this approach is viable by presenting results obtained by using power simulations performed on representative circuits with several different Trojan circuitry. These results show that Trojans that are 3-4 orders of magnitude smaller than the main circuit can be detected by signal processing techniques. While scaling our technique to detect even smaller Trojans in complex ICs with tens or hundreds of millions of transistors would require certain modifications to the IC design process, our results provide a starting point to address this important problem.