Unveiling the ISCAS-85 Benchmarks: A Case Study in Reverse Engineering
IEEE Design & Test
Moats and Drawbridges: An Isolation Primitive for Reconfigurable Hardware Based Systems
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Consistency-based characterization for IC Trojan detection
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Accurate estimation of vector dependent leakage power in the presence of process variations
ICCD'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Computer design
Overcoming an Untrusted Computing Base: Detecting and Removing Malicious Hardware Automatically
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Defeating UCI: Building Stealthy and Malicious Hardware
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Towards reducing the attack surface of software backdoors
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Detecting Trojans in an integrated circuit (IC) is an important but hard problem. A Trojan is malicious hardware--it can be extremely small in size and dormant until triggered by some unknown circuit state. To allow wake-up, a Trojan could draw a minimal amount of power, for example, to run a clock or a state machine, or to monitor a triggering event. We introduce DISTROY (Discover Trojan), a new approach that can efficiently and reliably detect extremely small background power leakage that a Trojan creates and as a result, we can detect the Trojan. We formulate our method based on compressive sensing, a recent advance in signal processing, which can recover a signal using the number of measurements approximately proportional to its sparsity rather than size. We argue that circuit states in which the Trojan background power consumption stands out are rare, and thus sparse, so that we can apply compressive sensing. We describe how this is done in DISTROY so as to afford sufficient measurement statistics to detect the presence of Trojans. Finally, we present our initial simulation results that validate DISTROY and discuss the impact of our work in the field of hardware security.