A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
The Dark Side of "Black-Box" Cryptography, or: Should We Trust Capstone?
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Designing and implementing malicious hardware
LEET'08 Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats
Towards trojan-free trusted ICs: problem analysis and detection scheme
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe
CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Trojan Side-Channels: Lightweight Hardware Trojans through Side-Channel Engineering
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Experiences in Hardware Trojan design and implementation
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy and Detection
IEEE Design & Test
Hardware Trojans in Wireless Cryptographic ICs
IEEE Design & Test
Optical Fault Attacks on AES: A Threat in Violet
FDTC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
FDTC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Tamper Evident Microprocessors
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Side-channel analysis of cryptographic software via early-terminating multiplications
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Malicious alterations of integrated circuits (ICs), introduced during either the design or fabrication process, are increasingly perceived as a serious concern by the global semiconductor industry. Such rogue alterations often take the form of a “hardware Trojan,” which may be activated from remote after the compromised chip or system has been deployed in the field. The devious actions of hardware Trojans can range from the disabling of all or part of the chip (i.e. “kill switch”), over the activation of a backdoor that allows an adversary to gain access to the system, to the covert transmission of sensitive information (e.g. cryptographic keys) off-chip. In the recent past, hardware Trojans which induce side-channel leakage to convey secret keys have received considerable attention. With the present paper we aim to broaden the scope of Trojan side-channels from dedicated cryptographic hardware to general-purpose processors on which cryptographic software is executed. In particular, we describe a number of simple micro-architectural modifications to induce or amplify information leakage via faulty computations or variations in the latency and power consumption of certain instructions. We also propose software-based mechanisms for Trojan activation and present two case studies to exemplify the induced side-channel leakage for software implementations of RSA and AES. Finally, we discuss a constructive use of micro-architectural Trojans for digital watermarking so as to facilitate the detection of illegally manufactured copies of processors.