Fault attacks on the montgomery powering ladder
ICISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Fault attack to the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm with multiple bit faults
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security of information and networks
Hardware trojans for inducing or amplifying side-channel leakage of cryptographic software
INTRUST'10 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trusted Systems
Differential fault analysis of ARIA in multi-byte fault models
Journal of Systems and Software
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An advantage of schemes based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is that they require a smaller key size than other public key schemes to guarantee the same level of security. Thus, ECC algorithms are well suited for systems with constrained resources like smart cards or mobile devices. When evaluating those devices, not only the security from a theoretical point of view, but also implementation attacks, like fault attacks, have to be taken into account. In this paper, we present a new fault attack on the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). We use a modification of the program flow to retrieve parts of the ephemeral key. The retrieved information allows erforming a lattice attack to determine the secret signing key. Furthermore, we propose a countermeasure to prevent such an attack.