Hardware Trojan side-channels based on physical unclonable functions

Authors:
Zheng Gong;Marc X. Makkes
Affiliations:
School of Computer Science, South China Normal University, Guangzhou, China and DIES group, University of Twente, The Netherlands;Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
Venue:
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
Year:
2011

Citing 10
Cited 0

Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting

SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher

CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Practical Attacks on Masked Hardware

CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
Trojan Side-Channels: Lightweight Hardware Trojans through Side-Channel Engineering

CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
MERO: A Statistical Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection

CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
KeeLoq and Side-Channel Analysis-Evolution of an Attack

FDTC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions

Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Improving the quality of ring oscillator PUFs on FPGAs

WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits

IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
An analysis of delay based PUF implementations on FPGA

ARC'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Reconfigurable Computing: architectures, Tools and Applications

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

The separation design and fabrication process in the semiconductor industry leads to potential threats such as trojan side-channels (TSCs). In this paper we design a new family of TSCs from physical unclonable functions (PUFs). In particular, a dedicated attack on the PRESENT block cipher is described by using our PUF-based TSCs. Finally we analyze the performance of our PUF-based TSCs and discuss other potential applications.