Power supply signal calibration techniques for improving detection resolution to hardware Trojans
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Trojan Side-Channels: Lightweight Hardware Trojans through Side-Channel Engineering
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
MERO: A Statistical Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Consistency-based characterization for IC Trojan detection
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
A Trojan-resistant system-on-chip bus architecture
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
Self-referencing: a scalable side-channel approach for hardware Trojan detection
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Detecting Trojans through leakage current analysis using multiple supply pad IDDQS
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
A unified submodular framework for multimodal IC Trojan detection
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Wireless security techniques for coordinated manufacturing and on-line hardware trojan detection
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Breakthrough silicon scanning discovers backdoor in military chip
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Experimental analysis of a ring oscillator network for hardware trojan detection in a 90nm ASIC
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Provably complete hardware trojan detection using test point insertion
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Energy attacks and defense techniques for wireless systems
Proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on Security and privacy in wireless and mobile networks
Is split manufacturing secure?
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Reverse engineering digital circuits using functional analysis
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Detection of trojans using a combined ring oscillator network and off-chip transient power analysis
ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems (JETC)
Post-deployment trust evaluation in wireless cryptographic ICs
DATE '12 Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
A sensor-assisted self-authentication framework for hardware trojan detection
DATE '12 Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Hardware trojan design and detection: a practical evaluation
Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Stealthy dopant-level hardware trojans
CHES'13 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Hardware Trojans in wireless cryptographic ICs: silicon demonstration & detection method evaluation
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Hardware security: threat models and metrics
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
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Trusted IC design is a recently emerged topic since fabrication factories are moving worldwide in order to reduce cost. In order to get a low-cost but effective hardware Trojan detection method to complement traditional testing methods, a new behavior-oriented category method is proposed to divide Trojans into two categories: explicit payload Trojan and implicit payload Trojan. This categorization method makes it possible to construct Trojan models and then lower the cost of testing. Path delays of nominal chips are collected to construct a series of fingerprints, each one representing one aspect of the total characteristics of a genuine design. Chips are validated by comparing their delay parameters to the fingerprints. The comparison of path delays makes small Trojan circuits significant from a delay point of view. The experiment’s results show that the detection rate on explicit payload Trojans is 100%, while this method should be developed further if used to detect implicit payload Trojans.